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It has recently been shown that incorporating ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿
preferences into a prototypical two-ability-type optimal nonlinear taxation model
leads to higher marginal income tax rates for both types of agents. Speci￿cally,
the high-skill type faces a positive marginal income tax rate, rather than zero as
in the conventional case. In this paper, agents￿utility functions are postulated to
exhibit ￿habit formation in consumption￿such that the prototypical two-ability-
type optimal nonlinear taxation model becomes a dynamic analytical framework.
We show that if the government can commit to its future ￿scal policy, the presence
of consumption habits does not a⁄ect the standard results on optimal marginal
income tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot pre-commit, the high-
skill type will face a negative marginal income tax rate, whereas the e⁄ect of habit
formation on the low-skill type￿ s marginal tax rate is ambiguous.
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There is now an extensive literature that examines the macroeconomic e⁄ects of ￿keep-
ing up with the Joneses￿and/or ￿habit formation in consumption￿preferences within
dynamic general equilibrium models; see recent examples of Carroll [2000], Ljungqvist
and Uhlig [2000], Dupor and Liu [2003], Alonso-Carrera, et al. [2004], and Guo [2005].
A ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿utility speci￿cation captures the idea that individuals
may evaluate their own consumption relative to that of their neighbours, thus individ-
ual consumption imposes a negative externality on others. On the other hand, ￿habit
formation in consumption￿ preferences imply that individuals evaluate their current
consumption relative to their own past consumption, hence increases in current con-
sumption will, ceteris paribus, reduce the utility level from future consumption. The
popularity of these preference formulations follows from their success in explaining var-
ious macroeconomic phenomena such as business cycle ￿ uctuations (Lettau and Uhlig
[2000]), the interrelations between savings and economic growth (Carroll, et al. [2000])
and the equity premium puzzle (Abel [1990, 1999], Constantinides [1990], Gali [1994]
and Campbell and Cochrane [1999]), among others.
In the area of public economics, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008] recently
have introduced ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿preferences to a prototypical two-ability-
type Mirrlees/Stiglitz model of optimal nonlinear income taxation.1 In the standard
framework where agents derive utility only from their own consumption, the govern-
ment seeks to redistribute from the high-skill to the low-skill type; however, since an
individual￿ s skill type is assumed to be private information, the government cannot
implement (the ￿rst-best) personalised lump-sum taxes. Instead, the government is
constrained to use (the second-best) incentive-compatible taxation in which individuals
are willing to reveal their skill types. In this case, it is well known that the optimal
incentive-compatible tax system is characterised by a zero marginal income tax rate on
the high-skill type together with a positive marginal tax rate on the low-skill agents,
where the positivity of marginal tax rate is motivated by distorting the low-skill type￿ s
1See also related papers by Oswald [1983] and Ireland [2001], among others.
2labour supply downwards in order to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. By con-
sidering a ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿utility function within this setting,2 Aronsson
and Johansson-Stenman [2008] provide another justi￿cation for marginal tax distortions,
namely, a corrective motive to overturn the e⁄ects of a negative consumption external-
ity. These authors show that ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿preferences lead to higher
optimal marginal income tax rates than those in the conventional case, hence both types
of agents face positive marginal tax rates. The intuition for higher marginal income tax
rates is to distort the labour supply of both types downwards, thereby lowering aggregate
income and consumption, which in turn attenuates the e⁄ects of negative consumption
externalities.
This paper builds on Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman￿ s [2008] analysis, and incor-
porates ￿habit formation in consumption￿preferences, where an agent￿ s utility depends
on the di⁄erence between her current consumption and a fraction of the past level of her
own consumption, into a prototypical two-ability-type nonlinear taxation model. Since
consumption habits turn the standard model into an intertemporal setting, we examine
a dynamic economy with two time periods.3 Although an in￿nite-horizon formulation
might be considered more general, our two-period framework allows the results to be
derived in a clear and intuitive manner. Moreover, the ￿rst period of our two-period
model is su¢ cient to capture the essential problem of dynamic optimal taxation. That
is, when choosing its present tax policy, the government must consider how its choices
a⁄ect its taxation possibilities in the future.
Our main results can be summarised as follows: (i) If in the ￿rst period the govern-
ment can commit to its second-period tax policy, habit formation in consumption exerts
no impact on the standard results that the high-skill type should face a zero marginal
income tax rate and the low-skill type should face a positive marginal tax rate. This is
2In particular, an agent￿ s utility depends on the di⁄erence between her own consumption and a
fraction of the contemporaneous level of average consumption in the economy.
3Berliant and Ledyard [2005], Apps and Rees [2006], and Brett and Weymark [2008], among others,
also work with two-period optimal nonlinear taxation models. In Berliant and Ledyard [2005], there
is a continuum of types. In Apps and Rees [2006] and Brett and Weymark [2008], there are only two
types; but there is a continuum of consumers of each type in Apps and Rees￿[2006] model, whereas
there is a single consumer of each type in the Brett and Weymark￿ s [2008] framework. Our model is
therefore most closely related to that of Brett and Weymark [2008].
3because the consumers rationally consider the e⁄ects on their second-period utility when
deciding their ￿rst-period consumption levels. Hence, there is no need for the govern-
ment to implement marginal tax distortions to correct the negative ￿internality￿that
an individual￿ s ￿rst-period consumption imposes on the utility from her second-period
consumption. (ii) If the government cannot commit to its second-period tax policy,
the presence of consumption habits lowers the marginal income tax rate faced by the
high-skill type, meaning she now faces a negative marginal tax rate, whereas the e⁄ect
of habit formation on the low-skill type￿ s marginal tax rate is ambiguous. As in the
commitment case, there is still no corrective motive for marginal tax distortions; but
when the government cannot pre-commit, consumption habits yield di⁄erent marginal
income tax rates that are optimal to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our two-period
model economy. Section 3 examines optimal income taxation with commitment, and
Section 4 examines optimal income taxation without commitment. Section 5 discusses
the implications under a ￿catching up with the Joneses￿or a ￿habit formation in leisure
(or labour)￿preference. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. Proofs and some other
mathematical details are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a simple two-period model economy with two consumers, who are distin-
guished by their labour productivity. Consumption by consumer i (i = 1, 2) in period
t (t = 1, 2) is denoted by ct
i, and labour supply by consumer i in period t is denoted
by lt
i. Consumer i￿ s wage in period t is denoted by wt





1 so that consumer 1 is the low-skill worker and consumer 2 is the high-skill




The consumers￿utility functions are given by u(c1
i) ￿ v(l1




i) in period 2, where u0(￿) > 0, u00(￿) < 0, v0(￿) > 0 and v00(￿) > 0. It can be seen
that consumption in period 1 sets a standard of living (or a ￿habit￿level of consumption)
which is used to evaluate the utility of consumption in period 2. The second-period
4utility function corresponds to the typical habit-formation model as speci￿ed, e.g., by
Alonso-Carrera, et al. [2004]. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) measures the importance of
￿rst-period consumption in evaluating the second-period level of utility. Since ￿ > 0, a
ceteris paribus increase in the ￿rst-period consumption reduces the second-period utility,
thus a negative ￿internality￿is present.
It is well known that in models with a ￿nite number of consumers, the optimal
income tax schedule may not be di⁄erentiable. We therefore follow the standard practice
of deriving expressions for ￿implicit￿marginal tax rates in terms of derivatives of the
utility function. To this end, suppose the consumers face smooth nonlinear income
tax functions T 1(y1
i) and T 2(y2
i) in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Then consumer i￿ s







































where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. In order to isolate the e⁄ects of habit formation,
we also assume that there are no savings. It is shown in the Appendix that the solution

































i denotes the marginal tax rate faced by consumer i in period t. These
expressions for the marginal tax rates correspond, as in static settings, to one minus
the marginal rate of substitution of pre-tax income for consumption;4 although here the
4See, e.g., Stiglitz [1982].
5marginal rates of substitution are complicated by the dynamic nature of the model and
the e⁄ect of habit formation.
3 Optimal Income Taxation with Commitment
If the period-1 government can commit to its second-period tax policy, the government

























































































































where (3.1) is a utilitarian social welfare function with the consumers￿utility functions
written in terms of the government￿ s choice variables ct
i and yt
i, (3.2) and (3.3) are
the government￿ s ￿rst- and second-period budget constraints,6 and (3.4) is consumer
2￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint. As in static nonlinear taxation models, we as-
sume that each consumer￿ s skill type is private information. The government must
therefore satisfy incentive-compatibility constraints to induce the consumers to choose
their intended tax treatments. However, we omit the low-skill consumer￿ s incentive-
compatibility constraint, since we focus on what Stiglitz [1982] calls the ￿normal￿case
and what Guesnerie [1995] calls ￿redistributive equilibria￿as the redistributive goals
of the government imply that the high-skill consumer￿ s incentive-compatibility con-
5A lifetime tax treatment consists of pre-tax income and post-tax income (which is equal to con-
sumption) in each period. The di⁄erence between pre-tax income and consumption is total taxes paid
(or transfers received).
6As with the consumers, we do not permit the government to save for analytical simplicity.
6straint binds, whereas the low-skill consumer￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint is al-
ways slack.7
It is shown in the Appendix that the solution to programme (3:1) ￿ (3:4) yields:
Proposition 1 When the government is able to commit to its second-period tax policy,
optimal nonlinear income taxation under habit formation in consumption is characterised
by: MTR1
1 > 0, MTR1
2 = 0, MTR2
1 > 0, and MTR2
2 = 0.
The presence of habit formation therefore has no e⁄ect on the pattern of optimal
marginal income tax distortions when the government can pre-commit. The intuition
is quite straightforward: since the consumers take into account how their ￿rst-period
consumption a⁄ects their second-period utility, there is no need for the government to
engage in corrective taxation. Hence, the only motive the government has to implement
marginal tax distortions is the same as that in the standard model, i.e., distorting
the low-skill type￿ s labour supply downwards to relax the high-skill type￿ s incentive-
compatibility constraint.
4 Optimal Income Taxation without Commitment
If the government cannot commit to its second-period tax policy, the government can
use skill-type information revealed in period 1 to implement (the ￿rst-best) personalised
lump-sum taxes in period 2. In this case, the government￿ s behaviour in period 2 can





































2 ￿ 0; (4.2)
where (4.1) is the second-period social welfare, and (4.2) is the government￿ s second-
period budget constraint. Since the government can identify the consumers, it does not
face incentive-compatibility constraints. The solution to programme (4:1)￿(4:2) yields



























The consumers and the government know that the government will solve programme































































































2) and b y2




2) represent the second-period
tax treatment consumer 2 would receive if she chose hc1
1;y1





2i, the government considers how its choices will
a⁄ect the level of social welfare attainable in period 2. The ￿rst-period social welfare
function (4.3) therefore includes the second-period value function W 2(￿). Equation (4.4)
is the government￿ s ￿rst-period budget constraint, while (4.5) is consumer 2￿ s incentive-
compatibility constraint. Since consumer 2 knows that she will be subject to the ￿rst-
best taxation in t = 2 if she reveals her skill type in t = 1, she must be o⁄ered a relatively
favourable tax treatment in period 1 to compensate for the relatively unfavourable tax
treatment she will receive in period 2.8 Consequently, in order for consumer 2 to be
willing to reveal her skill type, the utility she obtains from choosing hc1
2;y1
2i in period 1
plus the utility under the ￿rst-best taxation hc2
2(￿);y2
2(￿)i in period 2 must be at least as
high as that she could obtain from choosing hc1
1;y1
1i in period 1 plus the utility under
the second-best taxation hb c2
2(￿);b y2
2(￿)i in period 2. That is, if consumer 2 were to choose
8Indeed, the favourable tax treatment o⁄ered consumer 2 in period 1 to obtain skill-type information
could be very costly from a social welfare point of view. Instead, it is theoretically possible that the
government may prefer to force the same tax treatment on both consumers in period 1 so that no
skill-type information is revealed, even though it is then constrained to use the second-best taxation in
period 2. However, we focus only on the more economically interesting case in which the high-skill and
low-skill consumers receive di⁄erent tax treatments.
8hc1
1;y1
1i, the consumers would be pooled in period 1 and no skill-type information is
revealed. In this case, consumer 2 could only be subject to incentive-compatible taxation
in period 2.
It is shown in the Appendix that the solutions to programmes (4:1) ￿ (4:2) and
(4:3) ￿ (4:5) together imply that:
Proposition 2 When the government is unable to commit to its second-period tax policy,
optimal nonlinear income taxation under habit formation in consumption is characterised
by: MTR1
1 T 0, MTR1
2 < 0, MTR2
1 = 0, and MTR2
2 = 0.
Both consumers face zero marginal income tax rate in period 2 simply because the
￿rst-best taxation is used in that period. To understand why consumer 2 faces a neg-
ative marginal tax rate in period 1, note that in period 2 the government will choose
c2
1 and c2






2 as given.9 Now con-
sider a marginal increase in c1
2. Since u(￿) is strictly concave, the marginal utility of c2
2
becomes greater than that of c2
1, so the government can raise the second-period social
welfare by transferring a small amount of consumption from consumer 1 to consumer
2. Thus under the ￿rst-best taxation, an individual￿ s utility in period 2 is increasing
in her own ￿rst-period consumption.10 It follows that the government can increase con-
sumer 2￿ s second-period utility by raising her ￿rst-period consumption. This is achieved
through a negative marginal income tax rate to distort consumer 2￿ s ￿rst-period labour
supply upwards, which in turn generates additional income that can be used to increase
consumer 2￿ s ￿rst-period consumption. The reason the government wants to raise the
utility consumer 2 obtains under the ￿rst-best taxation in period 2 is that it makes her
more willing to reveal her skill type in period 1, i.e., relaxing her incentive-compatibility
constraint.
The sign of consumer 1￿ s ￿rst-period marginal tax rate is ambiguous, as there are
three factors at work. First, the government wants to distort consumer 1￿ s ￿rst-period
labour supply downwards, for the same reasons as in the standard model. Second,
9See equations (A.24) and (A.26) in the Appendix.
10While this might seem counter-intuitive, it is similar to the standard result that individual utility
under the ￿rst-best taxation is decreasing in the wage rate, since all individuals receive the same level
of consumption, but higher-wage individuals are required to work longer.
9habit formation implies that the government wants to distort consumer 1￿ s ￿rst-period
labour supply downwards to reduce her ￿rst-period income and consumption, which
reduces the utility she obtains in period 2 under the ￿rst-best taxation (recall that
individual utility in period 2 is increasing in her own ￿rst-period consumption). This
frees up resources that can be used to raise consumer 2￿ s second-period utility, which in
turn relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint. It follows that the ￿rst two factors
together make it optimal for consumer 1 to face a positive marginal income tax rate in
the ￿rst period. However, a third factor could work in exactly the opposite direction.
Speci￿cally, if consumer 2 were to mimic consumer 1 in the ￿rst period by choosing
hc1
1;y1
1i, any reduction in c1
1 used to lower consumer 1￿ s second-period utility would also
reduce consumer 2￿ s ￿rst-period consumption. As it is not clear how a reduction in both
consumers￿￿rst-period consumption levels a⁄ects consumer 2￿ s second-period utility, the
e⁄ect on the incentive-compatibility constraint is also unclear. As a result, consumer 1￿ s
￿rst-period marginal income tax rate cannot be signed.
We conclude this section with two comments. First, the preceding discussion makes
it clear that the only motive the government has to implement marginal tax distortions
is to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. As in the commitment case, there is no
role for corrective taxation. Second, habit formation in consumption necessarily lowers
the marginal income tax rate faced by the high-skill type, but may raise the marginal tax
rate faced by the low-skill agent. Therefore, unlike Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman
[2008] with ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿preferences, consumption habits can exert
opposite e⁄ects on the high-skill and low-skill￿ s optimal marginal tax rates.
5 Discussions
Since the Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008] model is static, individuals in their
setting can only evaluate their current consumption relative to contemporaneous average
consumption in the economy. This class of preferences is known as ￿keeping up with the
Joneses￿ . By contrast, ￿catching up with the Joneses￿postulates that an individual￿ s
current consumption is compared with past levels of average consumption. As a result,
10similar to the speci￿cation with habit formation, there exists intertemporal dependence
between consumptions at di⁄erent time periods. Here, we use our dynamic two-period






















where ￿ c1 represents the economy￿ s period-1 average consumption.
The main results can be summarised as follows: (i) When the government can pre-
commit, the standard optimal marginal tax rate results apply in period 2 simply because
this is the last period and contemporaneous consumption does not generate an exter-
nality. In period 1, however, both the high-skill and low-skill types face higher marginal
income tax rates than in the prototypical model for the same corrective-motive reasons
a la Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008]. Hence, it makes no di⁄erence whether
one works with ￿catching up￿or ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿preferences when the
government can commit to its future tax policy. (ii) When the government cannot pre-
commit, both types of agents face zero marginal tax rate in period 2 as this is the last
period, the ￿rst-best taxation is possible, and contemporaneous consumption does not
generate an externality. In period 1, however, the marginal income tax rates faced by
both types cannot be signed. On the one hand, the government wants to impose higher
marginal tax rates to reduce consumption and correct the e⁄ects of consumption ex-
ternalities as in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008]. But on the other hand, the
government may want to lower marginal tax rates to relax the incentive-compatibility
constraint for reasons similar as to why it may lower marginal tax rates under habit
formation. Since the corrective and incentive motives for marginal tax distortions can
work in opposite directions under ￿catching up with the Joneses￿when the government
cannot pre-commit, the optimal marginal income tax rates cannot be signed.
We have also examined the implications of habit formation in leisure (or labour), in
which individuals evaluate their current leisure relative to their own past leisure.11 In
11Examples that make use of habit formation in leisure (or labour) preferences include Kydland and
Prescott [1982], Eichenbaum, et al. [1988], Hotz, et al. [1988], Wen [1998], Lettau and Uhlig [2000],
and Guo and Janko [2008], among others.






















where ￿ 2 (￿1;0) so that l1
i and l2
i are intertemporal complements. As it turns out, the
results are identical to those under habit formation in consumption. When the govern-
ment can pre-commit, the standard optimal marginal tax rate results remain intact in
both periods since the consumers internalise how their ￿rst-period labour/leisure choice
a⁄ects their second-period utility. Hence, the government implements the conventional
pattern of marginal tax distortions to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint. When
the government cannot pre-commit, the high-skill type￿ s ￿rst-period marginal income tax
rate is negative, whereas the low-skill type￿ s cannot be signed. The intuition is exactly
the same as discussed in Section 4 for the case with habit formation in consumption.
Likewise, both types face zero marginal tax rate in period 2 because the government can
implement the ￿rst-best taxation in that period.
6 Concluding Comments
By introducing ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿ preferences to a prototypical optimal
nonlinear taxation model, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008] have moved the
recommendations of normative tax theory closer to the characteristics of real-world tax
systems in that a positive marginal income tax rate on the highest-skill worker can
be justi￿ed. In this paper, we have incorporated a closely-related class of preferences,
known as ￿habit formation in consumption￿ , into the standard two-ability-type optimal
nonlinear taxation framework. Our analysis shows that consumption habits a⁄ects the
conventional results only if the government cannot commit to its future tax policy,
which raises the question as to whether governments can pre-commit in practice. On
the one hand, one could argue that the commitment assumption is justi￿ed by the
observation that real-world income tax schedules are not frequently redesigned.12 On
12For example, Gaube [2007] makes this argument.
12the other hand, the no-commitment assumption might be justi￿ed by the fact that
the present government cannot impose binding constraints on future governments.13
Moreover, the second-best nature of the standard optimal nonlinear taxation model
stems from the assumption that skill types are private information. But taxation in
earlier periods may result in this information being revealed, which would enable the
government to implement the ￿rst-best (lump-sum) taxation in latter periods. Hence,
ruling out lump-sum taxes in a dynamic nonlinear taxation model via a commitment
assumption might be considered somewhat arti￿cial. In any event, our results show that
habit formation in consumption (or in leisure/labour), regardless of with or without
commitment, cannot help reconcile optimal tax theory with the tax systems observed
in practice. Unlike ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿ preferences, the feature of habit
formation, if anything, moves the recommendations of optimal tax theory further away
from the observed practice.
7 Appendix
Derivation of Equations (2.4) and (2.5)








































































13For example, Auerbach [2006] cites a proposal regarding the problem of the U.S. Social Security
system￿ s imbalance which includes a tax increase to be made in 2045. As Auerbach suggests, it is
highly unlikely that the government presiding in 2045 will feel constrained by a decision taken by






















Straightforward manipulation of (A.2) and (A.3) yields equation (2.4), while straight-
forward manipulation of (A.4) and (A.5) yields equation (2.5). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1




















































































































2 = 0; (A.13)
where ￿
1 > 0 is the multiplier on the government￿ s ￿rst-period budget constraint (3.2),
￿
2 > 0 is the multiplier on the government￿ s second-period budget constraint (3.3), and
￿ > 0 is the multiplier on consumer 2￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint (3.4).








which using (2.5) establishes that MTR2










14which using (2.4) establishes that MTR1
2 = 0.








































































































which using (2.5) establishes that MTR2
1 > 0.























































































































which using (2.4) establishes that MTR1
1 > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2

















































2 = 0; (A.28)
where ￿
2 > 0 is the multiplier on the government￿ s second-period budget constraint
















which using (2.5) establish that MTR2
1 = 0 and MTR2
2 = 0.

























































































































































1 = 0; (A.34)
where ￿
1 > 0 is the multiplier on the government￿ s ￿rst-period budget constraint (4.4),
and ￿ > 0 is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint (4.5). To derive
expressions for @W 2(￿)=@c1
1 and @W 2(￿)=@c1
2, note that the Lagrangian corresponding to





















































































































17Dividing both sides of (A.38) by (1+￿)[u0(c1
2) ￿ ￿￿u0(c2
2 ￿ ￿c1






























































2 < 0, which establishes that MTR1
2 < 0. Application
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and the determinant of A is given by:



















































































































To show that MTR1




















































































where use has been made of (A.36). Using (A.26), (A.27) and (A.32), equation (A.46)


















































































































































































































The ￿rst term in (A.48) is positive, since w1
2 > w1
1 and v(￿) is strictly convex. Using
















1 > 0, and thus the second term in (A.48) is also positive. Likewise, one can apply
these techniques to sign the last term in (A.48), but the result is ambiguous. The last
19term requires determining the comparative statics of a second-best nonlinear income
tax problem, which are generally too complex to yield unambiguous results. Therefore,
MTR1
1 cannot be signed. ￿
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